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CASENOTES
ABROGATING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE OUTSIDE OF
THE CRIMINAL TRIAL CONTEXT? PENNSYLVANIA BOARD
OF PROBATION & PAROLE V. SCOTT: ONE STEP CLOSER
TO A PER SE RULE IN FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
As citizens of the United States, most of us would abhor
warrantless police intrusion into our homes. The Fourth
Amendment' protects all citizens against unreasonable searches
and seizures.2 When unaccompanied by a valid search warrant,
a search of a residence is presumptively unreasonable.3 Thus,
the law proscribes overly-aggressive investigatory methods that
trammel the rights of American citizens. What happens, howev-
er, when the protected right belongs to a paroled felon suspect-
ed of violating the conditions of his parole? In Pennsylvania
Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott,4 the United States Su-
preme Court refused to extend to parolees the remedies which
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
2. See id. Specifically, the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution establishes
that
[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, support-
ed by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
3. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
4. 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2017-18 (1998).
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are offered to other citizens when illegal police conduct infring-
es upon their Fourth Amendment guarantees.5
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the
need for judicial deterrence of overzealous law enforcement
officers.6 Toward this end, the Court has generally mandated
the exclusion from criminal trials of evidence obtained through
illegal means, provided the exclusion deters police misconduct.!
Thus, the fruits of police searches that violate the "reasonable-
ness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment are often sup-
pressed at trial. The underlying rationale is that exclusion
deters police officers from conducting illegal searches because
they know that any evidence seized would subsequently prove
inadmissible at trial.8
Since first enunciating the exclusionary rule, the United
States Supreme Court has striven to limit its impact and ef-
fect.9 The Court has ruled that "the exclusionary rule has nev-
er been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evi-
dence from all proceedings or against all persons."'o Outside
the criminal trial context, the Court has expressed extreme
5. See id.
6. See Arval A. Morris, The Exclusionary Rule, Deterrence and Posner's Economic
Analysis of Law, 57 WASH. L. REV. 647, 650 (1982). Originally, however, the Supreme
Court established the exclusionary rule upon concluding that the suppression of ille-
gally obtained evidence was mandated by the Fourth Amendment. See Weeks v. Unit-
ed States, 232 U.S. 383, 398-99 (1914). Thus, utilization of the rule was obligatory in
any cases involving unreasonable searches and seizures. Subsequently, the Court
ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment required the extension of the exclusionary rule
to criminal proceedings in state courts. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-58
(1961); see also United States v. Janis 428 U.S. 433, 443-47 (1976).
The Burger Court of the 1960s systematically stripped away the constitutional
undergirdings of the exclusionary rule. See Morris, supra, at 650. Ultimately, in Unit-
ed States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974), the Court rejected the notion that
the Constitution mandated the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. Rather, Justice
Powell concluded, "uLin sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safe-
guard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect." Id. Later, the
Court strengthened and solidified its deterrence justification in United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
7. See Laurence Naughton, Note, Taking Back Our Streets: Attempts in the 104th
Congress to Reform the Exclusionary Rule, 38 B.C. L. REV. 205, 217 (1996).
8. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2017.
9. See James A. Adams, Search and Seizure as Seen by the Supreme Court Jus-
tices: Are They Serious or Is This Just Judicial Humor?, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REv. 413, 464-65 (1993) (describing how the policy shift to deterrence severely limits
the application of the exclusionary rule).
10. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
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reluctance to apply the rule." In Pennsylvania Board of Proba-
tion & Parole v. Scott, the Court once again declined to extend
the exclusionary rule beyond the criminal trial setting. 2 Spe-
cifically, the Court ruled that a parole revocation hearing is an
inappropriate venue for application of the exclusionary rule. 13
Thus, state hearing officers may justifiably refuse to suppress
illegally obtained evidence at parole revocation proceedings.'4
In evaluating the efficacy of exclusion, the Court weighed the
legitimate state interest in admitting probative evidence at
parole revocation proceedings against the deterrent effect of the
rule upon officers.' 5 The Court examined such factors as the
social costs of exclusion, the nature of the proceedings, and the
role of probation officers." Concluding that the state interest
in efficient parole revocation far outweighed the deterrent effect
of applying the rule, the Court refused to mandate exclusion at
revocation hearings.'7
This note examines the Scott opinion and comments on its
niche within the exclusionary rule jurisprudence of the United
States Supreme Court. Part II traces the history of Scott from
the initial parole revocation hearing, through the Pennsylvania
courts, and to the United States Supreme Court. Part III exam-
ines the competing interests involved in applying the
exclusionary rule to parole revocation proceedings. Specifically
analyzed are the social costs of exclusion and the potential
deterrent impact of applying the rule at parole hearings. Final-
ly, Part IV considers the effect of the Scott decision upon future
exclusionary rule holdings.
11. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (habeas proceeding); United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (civil tax proceeding); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 338.
12. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2020.
13. See id. (holding that extension of the rule to revocation hearings would
change the nature of parole proceedings and provide only minimal deterrence).
14. See id. "We therefore hold that the federal exclusionary rule does not bar the
introduction at parole revocation hearings of evidence seized in violation of parolees'
Fourth Amendment rights." Id.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 2020-22.
17. See id at 2022. "The marginal deterrence of unreasonable searches and sei-
zures is insufficient to justify such an intrusion." Id.
1999] 633
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II. PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION & PAROLE V. SCOTT:
A BALANCING OF THE INTERESTS
On March 31, 1983, Keith M. Scott began serving a ten to
twenty year sentence for third-degree murder."5 Scott remained
incarcerated for just over ten years in the Pennsylvania penal
system. Pursuant to a parole agreement, the Pennsylvania
Board of Corrections released Scott from prison on September 1,
1993."9 Under the terms of the agreement, Scott was to refrain
from "owning or possessing any firearms or other weapons."0
18. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2018. Scott pleaded nolo contendere on April 2, 1982,
and whs subsequently incarcerated with an effective date of March 31, 1983. The
minimum term expiration date of Scott's sentence was March 31, 1993, and the maxi-
mum was March 31, 2003. See Scott v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 698
A.2d 32, 32 (Pa. 1997).
19. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2018.
20. Id. (citing the parole agreement). The Supreme Court also noted that the
agreement contained a consent provision that authorized parole officers to search
Scott's residence without a search warrant. Specifically, the parole agreement provid-
ed:
I expressly consent to the search of my person, property and residence,
without a warrant by agents of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole. Any items, in [sic] the possession of which constitutes a violation
of parole/reparole shall be subject to seizure, and may be used as evi-
dence in the parole revocation process.
Id. The Supreme Court issued no opinion on the efficacy of this consent provision or
upon the constitutionality of the search performed by the parole officers. Rather, the
Court concluded that it need not address these issues because it had jurisdiction to
determine whether the exclusionary rule should apply to parole revocation hearings.
See id. at 2018-19. Because the Court determined that the exclusionary rule is an
inappropriate remedy at such hearings, it did not need to rule on whether the con-
sent provision obviated the unconstitutionality of the warrantless search. See id.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has recently ruled that consent pro-
visions within parole agreements have no effect when the subsequent search is based
upon "mere speculation." See Scott, 698 A.2d at 36. The court's decision in Common-
wealth v. Williams, 692 A.2d 1031 (Pa. 1997), established that consent provisions
authorized warrantless searches only when based upon "reasonable suspicion that the
parolee had committed a parole violation, and . . . the search was reasonably related
to the parole officer's duty." Id. at 1036. Under the court's analysis, the consent pro-
vision did not bar Scott from seeking to suppress the evidence at his hearing because
the search was based on mere speculation that he had committed a parole violation.
See Scott, 698 A.2d at 36. Now that the Supreme Court has declined to extend the
exclusionary rule to parole revocation hearings, the effect of a consent provision
means very little to the adjudication of the hearing. Even evidence obtained in gross
violation of the Fourth Amendment will be admitted at the hearing.
Despite the Court's ruling, consent provisions may still have some import. In
determining departmental sanctions and guidelines for its officers, the Board of Pro-
bation and Parole will undoubtedly consider the impact of consent provisions. Thus,
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The agreement further provided that Scott "must not consume
alcohol" or engage in any "assaultive behavior."21
Just five months after Scott's release, parole officers sought
and were granted an arrest warrant for Scott based upon evi-
dence that he owned firearms and other weapons, had con-
sumed alcohol on at least two occasions, and had verbally as-
saulted a coworker.' After being arrested at a local diner on
February 4, 1994, Scott provided the arresting officers with the
keys to his residence.' Without obtaining a search warrant,
the officers proceeded to Scott's home, where they performed a
search of Scott's bedroom and an adjacent sitting room.' Al-
warrantless searches of residences, which ordinarily would result in sanctions against
the parole officers, could be allowed if the officers acted upon reasonable suspicion
and the search was reasonably related to their duties. As a result, officers facing dis-
cipline for warrantless searches may exculpate themselves by showing that their
search was permissible due to the consent provision.
Further, the reasonableness of the search is still very much an issue when new
criminal charges are brought against a parolee based upon evidence obtained by pa-
role officers. When brought in a criminal court, new charges must be based upon
evidence obtained reasonably. Thus, the effect of the consent provision upon the actu-
al search itself will be of paramount importance at trial. See also infra notes 55-58
and accompanying text.
21. Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2018 (citing the parole agreement).
22. See Scott v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 668 A.2d 590, 592-93
(Pa. Commw. 1995). Specifically, the weapons charge alleged that Scott possessed
each of the following- a .22 Magnum revolver pistol, a 10-millimeter Glock handgun,
a Mossberg 12-gauge pump shotgun, a Glenfield 12-gauge bolt action shotgun, a
Stevens 12-gauge single shotgun, a Harrington-Richardson 12-gauge single shotgun, a
Glenfield .22 caliber semi-automatic, and a compound bow. See id. Except for the .22
Magnum and the Glock handgun, all of the weapons were confiscated from Scott's
residence, which he shared with his mother and stepfather. See Scott, 698 A.2d at 33.
At the parole revocation hearing, Scott's stepfather claimed ownership of the weapons
found within the residence and represented that Scott had no knowledge of their
existence within the home. See id. at 34.
The charges further alleged that Scott had consumed Zima Clear malt liquor on
or about September 2, 1993, just one day following his release from prison. See Scott,
668 A.2d at 593. Additionally, it was alleged that he consumed Southern Comfort
alcoholic beverages on or about October 18, 1993. See id. Finally, the charges also
alleged that Scott committed assaultive conduct in violation of his parole by ap-
proaching a coworker in November 1993, and stating repeatedly, "I am going to
fuckin' kill you.' Id.
23. See Scott, 698 A-2d at 33.
24. See Scott, 668 A.2d at 593. At the parole revocation hearing, Scott testified
that the adjacent room, in which the weapons were found, was a sitting room used
exclusively by his mother. See id. This testimony was corroborated by Scott's stepfa-
ther, who additionally claimed that the weapons belonged to him and that he had
hidden them under one of the couches located within the sitting room. See id.
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though Scott's mother was in the home at the time, she did not
consent to, nor did she actively oppose, the search of the resi-
dence.' The officers found no evidence of contraband in Scott's
bedroom, but did locate numerous firearms under a couch in
the sitting room.'
On March 30, 1994, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole brought charges against Scott in a parole revocation
hearing." Over the objection of Scott's counsel, the adminis-
trative law judge allowed the evidence obtained from the search
of Scott's residence to be introduced against him in the hear-
ing.' The judge concluded that the search was reasonable;
therefore, the evidence should not be suppressed.' Subse-
quently, the Parole Board ruled against Scott on all the weap-
ons and alcohol charges. °  The assault charge was dis-
missed.3 In a notice of decision, dated June 16, 1994, the Pa-
role Board informed Scott that he was to be recommitted to
serve the remainder of his sentence, plus an additional thirty-
six months of backtime.32
Scott sought and was granted review of the Parole Board's
administrative order by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylva-
25. See id. at 594. Scott's mother escorted the agents to Scott's bedroom, but only
after the agents had threatened to go upstairs to locate and search the room them-
selves. See id.
26. See Scott, 698 A.2d at 33. In addition to the firearms, which were taped to-
gether under the couch, the officers found a compound bow and three arrows in a
nearby closet. See id.
27. See id.
28. See Scott, 668 A.2d at 594. Specifically, Scott's counsel argued that the search
was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the homeowner (Scott's
mother) did not consent to the search. See id.
29. See Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2018
(1998). The administrative law judge derived the same result as the Supreme Court
of the United States (admission of the evidence seized pursuant to the search), but
utilized a different approach. The judge concluded, that because the search was rea-
sonable under Fourth Amendment analysis, no consideration of the exclusionary rule
would be appropriate. See Scott, 698 A.2d at 33. The Supreme Court, however, ruled
that the exclusionary rule is inappropriate at parole revocation hearings; therefore,
the Court need not consider the reasonableness of the search. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at
2018; see also supra note 20.
30. See Scott, 668 A.2d at 593-94. The Parole Board made clear that it had relied
in part upon the testimony of the officer who had conducted the search of Scott's
residence. See id. at 594.
31. See id. at 593-94.
32. See id.
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nia.' Again, Scott argued that the search performed by parole
officers was unreasonable and, therefore, the evidence obtained
thereunder should have been suppressed.' The court recog-
nized that "it is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law
that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable." 5 Under certain circumstances,
however, the Supreme Court of the United States has carved
out exceptions to this fundamental doctrine. When "special
needs" make search warrants and probable cause impracticable,
the Court has allowed the introduction of evidence obtained
pursuant to warrantless searches of residences.36
The Commonwealth Court concluded that both state and
federal jurisprudence authorized warrantless searches of
probationer's homes, if there was a sufficient statutory or regu-
latory framework in place to ensure that the search would be
reasonable." Given the legitimate public interest in regulating
the conduct of parolees, the court concluded that a search war-
rant based upon probable cause was not required in order for
parole officers to enter and search Scott's home.' Rather, the
court concluded that parole officers needed only to show that
they followed approved regulatory guidelines while conducting
the search. 9 Despite the reduced standard, the court found
33. See id. at 592.
34. See id. at 594. On appeal, Scott also claimed: (1) the administrative law judge
erred in allowing impermissible hearsay evidence to be heard by the Parole Board; (2)
the evidence relating to the weapons and alcohol charges was insufficient to justify
the Parole Board's findings; (3) the thirty-six month recommitment sentence was
administered without adequate notice; and (4) the notice of the hearing and the
charges that were to be brought against him were impermissibly vague. See id. Be-
cause these claims were resolved before the case reached the Supreme Court of the,
United States, they are beyond the present scope of this casenote and will not be ad-
dressed further.
35. Id. at 595 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)).
36. See id. The Supreme Court has expanded the "special needs" concept to in-
clude any warrantless search that would ordinarily be deemed unconstitutional pro-
vided that the government show the requisite "special need." See, e.g., Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995);
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868 (1987); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
37. See Scott, 668 A.2d at 596.
38. See id. at 595-96.
39. See id. at 595-97. The court relied upon the Supreme Court's Griffin decision
for the proposition that a search of a probationer's home is reasonable only if con-
6371999]
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that the search was unreasonable because there were insuffi-
cient procedural and regulatory safeguards in place to ensure
the requisite degree of reasonableness.'
Consequently, the Commonwealth Court considered whether
exclusion of the evidence derived from the unreasonable search
was an appropriate remedy in a parole revocation hearing. The
court noted that the majority of federal and state jurisdictions
have not applied the exclusionary rule to parole revocation
hearings.4' In finding that the exclusionary rule was indeed
ducted pursuant to a "regulation which itself satisfied the Fourth Amendment's
'reasonableness' requirement." Id. at 596 (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873). In Griffin,
the United States Supreme Court determined that probationers "do not enjoy the
absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only a conditional liberty ...
dependent upon the observance of probation restrictions." Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874.
The Court did conclude, however, that searches of a probationer's home must still
satisfy the "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 873.
One way to satisfy this requirement is to establish a statutory or regulatory frame-
work which both grants officers the right to conduct warrantless residential searches
and ensures that the searches will be conducted in a "reasonable" manner. See id. at
873-74.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court took this concept even further than the Grif-
fin Court envisioned. In Commonwealth v. Pickron, 634 A.2d 1093, 1098 (Pa. 1993),
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a statutory or regulatory framework is
essential to justify warrantless searches of a probationer's home. Rather than merely
concluding that the existence of a framework is one way to satisfy the "reasonable-
ness" requirement, the Pickron court determined that it is the only way, absent the
consent of the homeowner. See id. In the absence of this regulatory framework, only
the consent of the homeowner would obviate the "unreasonableness" of the search. See
id. The Commonwealth Court determined that Scott's mother had not given unequivo-
cal, specific, and voluntary consent to the officers conducting the search, which was
required if the consent was to be considered effective. See Scott, 668 A.2d at 597; see
also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
40. See Scott, 668 A.2d at 597. "Our research has uncovered no enacted statute or
regulation which would grant (an officer] the authority to conduct . . . a [warrantless]
search." Id. Because parole officers conducted a warrantless search of Scott's resi-
dence, "without a statutory or regulatory framework authorizing such a search, we
must conclude that the search was conducted in violation of Scott's limited Fourth
Amendment rights." Id.
41. See id. at 599. After examining the federal circuits, the court concluded that
only the Fourth Circuit had held that the exclusionary rule should be generally appli-
cable to parole revocation hearings. See id. (citing United States v. Workman, 585
F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978)). The majority of federal jurisdictions which have considered
the issue have concluded that the exclusionary rule is not applicable to parole revoca-
tion hearings. See, e.g., United States v. Finney, 897 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826 (3rd Cir. 1983); United States v.
Frederickson, 581 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d
1019 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Brown, 488 F.2d 94
638
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appropriate, however, the court applied the balancing test set
forth in United States v. Calandra.42 The court determined
that "the deterrence factor substantially outweighs the injury
which would result from the evidence obtained from [the] illegal
search of Scott's approved residence."43 Because the deterrent
effect upon parole officers far outweighed the detriment done to
the public interest in regulating parolees, the court concluded
that the exclusionary rule was a proper remedy." The court
reversed and remanded the findings of the Parole Board be-
cause they were based in part upon evidence that should have
been excluded.45
The Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole appealed
the decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.' After exam-
ining the issue differently than the Commonwealth Court, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court nonetheless agreed that the
search of Scott's residence was unreasonable. The court con-
cluded that there were sufficient regulatory guidelines in place
to justify a warrantless search.' However, a valid warrantless
(5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971); United States ex.
rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970).
Likewise, the Commonwealth Court determined that the majority of state courts
have declined to extend the exclusionary rule to parole revocation proceedings. For a
detailed listing of state cases for and against implementing the exclusionary rule at
parole revocation hearings, see Scott, 668 A-2d at 599.
42. See Scott, 668 A.2d at 600 (utilizing the balancing of interest test set forth in
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974)); see also supra note 6. Although the
Commonwealth Court did not identify Calandra as its source for the test, it recog-
nized and weighed interests identical to those set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Calandra. Compare Scott, 668 A.2d at 600, with Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349-
51.
43. Scott, 668 A.2d at 600.
44. See id.
45. See id. "The hearing officer should have excluded the evidence obtained in the
illegal search at Scott's parole hearing. Because this evidence was improperly admit-
ted over Scott's objection, we must reverse and remand this case for a new revocation
hearing." Id.
46. See Scott v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 698 A-2d 32 (1997).
47. See id. at 36.
48. See id. The court stated that Scott's signing of the consent provision, although
it did not obviate his Fourth Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable
searches, nonetheless sanctioned warrantless residential searches, provided they were
reasonable. See id. at 35-36. The court reiterated that:
the parolee's signing of a parole agreement giving his parole officer per-
mission to conduct a warrantless search does not mean either that the
parole officer can conduct a search at any time and for any reason or
640 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:631
search must be based upon "(1)... reasonable suspicion that
the parolee had committed a parole violation, and (2) that the
search was reasonably related to the parole officer's duty."49
Because the court found that the parole officers acted upon
"mere speculation" rather than "reasonable suspicion," it ruled
that the search was unreasonable. 0
In determining whether to apply the exclusionary rule to the
unreasonably obtained evidence, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court also utilized the "balancing of interests" test developed in
United States v. Calandra.5 The court decided, like the Com-
monwealth Court, to extend the exclusionary rule to parole re-
vocation hearings.52 Reasoning that exclusion of evidence nega-
tively impacts the administration of the parole process, the
court ruled that evidence should only be suppressed if the de-
terrent effects of suppression outweigh its negative impact.53
The court found that the deterrent effect of suppression hinges
upon the searching officers' knowledge of the status of the pa-
rolee.'
When searching officers know that the residence belongs to a
parolee, there is an added incentive and temptation to conduct
searches without a warrant.5 To countervail this trend, the
that the parolee relinquishes his Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches. Rather, the parolee's signature acts as ac-
knowledgement that the parole officer has a right to conduct reasonable
searches of his residence listed on the parole agreement without a war-
rant.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 692 A.2d 1031, 1036 (1997)).
49. Id. at 36.
50. See id. Because the parole officers who had searched Scott's residence "could
not recall the source of the information regarding the existence of the weapons ...
the agents' suspicion was based upon mere speculation and was insufficient to sup-
port a warrantless search of the room adjacent to [Scott's] bedroom." Id.
51. See id. (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974)).
52. See id. at 38. "The exclusionary rule should therefore apply to [Scott's] parole
revocation hearing and the evidence obtained from the illegal search of his residence
should be suppressed." Id. at 39.
53. See id. at 36. "In determining whether the exclusionary rule should be ex-
tended, we must balance the potential benefits of excluding the evidence against the
potential injury to the historic role and function of the proceedings in which the ille-
gally obtained evidence is to be admitted." Id.
54. See id. at 37-38 (adopting the rationale advanced in United States v. Winsett,
518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975), and United States v. Rea, 678 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1982)).
55. See id. at 37. To explain this approach, the court quoted the Ninth Circuit's
Winsett decision:
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court ruled that any evidence obtained pursuant to an unrea-
sonable warrantless search should be suppressed if the search-
ing officers were aware of the parolee's status.' Where the
officers are unaware that the residence belongs to a parolee,
the court found that the officers will be sufficiently deterred
from unreasonable searches by the threat that the evidence will
be suppressed at a criminal trial.57 Because in this case, how-
ever, the officers were aware of Scott's status and then proceed-
ed to conduct an unreasonable warrantless search, the obtained
evidence should have been suppressed.'
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to
the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole's appeal and
reversed the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.59
Eschewing the analysis of the Pennsylvania state courts, the
Supreme Court ruled that no federal law mandates the exclu-
sion of illegally obtained evidence at a parole revocation hear-
[Wihen the police at the moment of search know that a suspect is a
probationer, they may have a significant incentive to carry out an illegal
search even though knowing that evidence would be inadmissible in any
criminal proceeding. The police have nothing to risk: If the motion to
suppress in the criminal proceedings were denied, defendant would stand
convicted of a new crime; and if the motion were granted, the defendant
would still find himself behind bars due to the revocation of probation.
Thus, in such circumstances, extension of the exclusionary rule to the
probation revocation proceeding may be necessary to effectuate Fourth
Amendment safeguards.
Id. at 37 (quoting Winsett, 518 F.2d at 54 n.5).
56. See id. at 37-38.
57. See id. at 38. The court further illustrated its logic by using the following
example:
[W]e first examine the instance when a police officer is unaware of the
parolee's status. In that situation, the officer sees the parolee as any
other citizen with full constitutional protection. The officer has no incen-
tive to illegally obtain evidence as he is cognizant that such evidence will
most likely be subject to suppression. Thus, the deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule is adequately served by the application of the rule in
the criminal trial. There is no reason to apply the rule in a parole revo-
cation hearing because it is unlikely to act as an additional deterrent to
illegal police behavior.
Id. The court did not address the problems associated with this approach. Specifically,
a knowledge-based formula requires a great degree of collateral litigation to determine
what the officers knew at the time of the search. See id.
58. See id. at 39 (holding that the officers knew of Scott's status because they
had recently arrested him for parole violations).
59. See Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2017
(1998).
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ing." Written by Justice Thomas, the majority opinion cited
the high costs of excluding probative evidence at hearings in or-
der to justify the court's reticence in extending the exclusionary
rule beyond its traditional use in criminal trials.6' Rather than
passing judgment upon the searching officers' conformance with
Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" requirements, the Court
stated that, because exclusion is not required, even the fruits of
an unreasonable search may be admitted at a parole revocation
hearing. 2
In determining that the costs of exclusion outweigh its deter-
rent impact, the Supreme Court found two aspects of the parole
revocation system compelling. First, the Court cited the State's
"'overwhelming interest' in ensuring that a parolee complies
with [parole] requirements and is returned to prison if he fails
to do so." ' Thus, the Court determined that exclusion would
impermissibly allow parolees to avoid the repercussions of their
violations." Second, the Court noted that parole revocation
proceedings are civil in nature and as a result the relationship
between parole officers and parolees is supervisory rather than
adversarial.' The Court reasoned that parole officers have lit-
tle stake in whether or not their parolees return to prison and
thus, exclusion would have no deterrent effect upon them."
Other means of deterrence, such as departmental discipline and
60. See id. at 2020.
61. See id. "The costs of excluding reliable, probative evidence are particularly
high in the context of parole revocation proceedings." Id.
62. See id.
63. Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972)).
64. See id. The Court also warned that parolees, especially those who commit
parole violations, have a high rate of recidivism. Thus, exclusion of evidence at parole
hearings greatly enhances the likelihood of future criminal offenses. See id.; see also
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987).
65. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2022 (citing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 879). The Court also
quoted Morrissey for the proposition that it is "unfair to assume that the parole offi-
cer bears hostility against a parolee that destroys his neutrality; realistically the
failure of the parolee is in a sense a failure for his supervising officer." Id. (quoting
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485-86).
66. See id. Additionally, the Court ruled that adoption of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court's "knowledge" rationale, see supra note 57 and accompanying text, would
result in only minimal deterrence, insufficient to justify exclusion. See Scott, 118 S.
Ct. at 2022.
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damages actions, are more appropriate than the exclusion of
probative evidence."
In his dissent, Justice Souter claimed that the majority's
decision rested upon an inaccurate understanding of the parole
revocation process."e Rather than conceding that a parole offi-
cer has little stake in the outcome of a revocation hearing,
Souter reasoned that parole officers "often serve as both prose-
cutors and law enforcement officials in their relationship with
probationers and parolees."' When parole officers learn of pa-
role violations, they cease their administrative functions and
assume an adversarial role.0° The officers acquire a stake in
the outcome of the hearing because it reflects upon their inves-
tigative abilities.7' Thus, exclusion is appropriate because it
has a highly deterrent effect upon officers who might otherwise
conduct unreasonable searches.72
The dissent further claimed that the majority underestimated
the importance of parole revocation hearings.73 Rather than
pursuing new criminal charges, parole officers often present
evidence obtained from searches exclusively in revocation hear-
ings. 4 If a parolee is found to have violated his parole condi-
tions, the Parole Board may recommit him to serve the remain-
der of his sentence.75 The dissent reasoned that "[s]ince time
67. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2022.
68. See id. at 2024 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter, joined by Justices
Ginsberg and Breyer (Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting opinion), sought to
distinguish Scott from cases in which the court declined to extend the exclusionary
rule beyond the criminal trial context. See cases cited supra note 11.
69. Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2025 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting NEIL P. COHEN &
JAMES J. GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE § 11.04, at 533 (1983)).
70. See id. at 2026 (Souter, J., dissenting). "[An exclusive focus on the benevolent
attitudes of those who administer the probation/parole system when it is working
successfuly obscures the modification in attitude which is likely to take place once
the officer has decided to recommend revocation." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973)).
71. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
72. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Further, Justice Souter stated that deterrents
such as departmental training and discipline are hollow threats. See id. (Souter, J.,
dissenting). There was no evidence presented at any level of the litigation to support
the notion that Pennsylvania had specific training programs in place, or that it had
ever disciplined an officer for an unreasonable search. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
73. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2026 (Souter, J., dissenting).
74. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 478-79 (1972); see also Rose v.
Haskins, 388 F.2d 91, 104 (6th Cir. 1968) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
75. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2027 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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on the street before revocation is not subtracted from the bal-
ance of the sentence to be served on revocation, the balance
may well be long enough to render recommitment the practical
equivalent of a new sentence for a separate crime." 6 Due to
the administrative ease of recommitment, it is often the prima-
ry tool for the incarceration of parolees." Thus, because offi-
cers do not envision presenting the obtained evidence at trial,
they will not be deterred from committing Fourth Amendment
violations by applying the exclusionary rule solely to criminal
trials.78
III. APPLICATION OF THE CALANDRA "BALANCING OF
INTERESTS" TEST IN SCOTT
Both the majority and the dissent utilized similar methodolo-
gies in analyzing the problems posed in Scott. Specifically, the
two sides employed the Calandra "balancing of interests" test in
reaching contrary conclusions.79 Each side weighed differently
the multiple interests involved in excluding evidence from pa-
role revocation hearings. ° To assess the merits of the Scott
opinion, it is necessary to consider the findings of the Court in
light of previous Calandra test jurisprudence. The Court's his-
torical treatment of the social costs of excluding evidence, the
nature of parole hearings, and the role of probation officers is
76. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at
480) (citation omitted).
77. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479. "Sometimes revocation occurs when the parol-
ee is accused of another crime; it is often preferred to a new prosecution because of
the procedural ease of recommitting the individual on the basis of a lesser showing
by the State." Id.
78. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2027 (Souter, J., dissenting). "The upshot is that
without a suppression remedy in revocation proceedings, there will often be no influ-
ence capable of deterring Fourth Amendment violations when parole revocation is a
possible response to new crime." Id.
79. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350 (1974). In determining
whether to apply the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings, the Court stated,
"[algainst [the] potential damage to the role and functions of the grand jury, we must
weigh the benefits to be derived from [the] proposed extension of the exclusionary
rule." Id.
80. See Note, The Supreme Court 1997 Term: Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV.
182, 187-88 (1998) (noting that the disagreement between the majority and dissent
turned on questions of fact rather than questions of law).
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of tantamount importance to an analysis of the conclusions
posited by both the majority and the dissent.
A. The Social Costs of Excluding Probative Evidence at Parole
Revocation Hearings
The Supreme Court has long recognized the social costs asso-
ciated with implementing the exclusionary rule. Prior to
Calandra, the Court acknowledged, but subsequently ignored,
the social ramifications of the rule.8 Operating on the belief
that the Constitution mandated the exclusion of illegally ob-
tained evidence, the" Court ruled that judicial integrity required
it to uphold the Constitution, regardless of the resulting social
impact.82 The Calandra decision represented a shift in the
Court's justification of the exclusionary rule.' No longer en-
cumbered by perceived constitutional requirements, the Court
was free to consider whether, in light of the social consequences
of evidentiary suppression, the exclusionary rule should be in-
voked against all persons and in all proceedings.
The exclusionary rule often exacts a high social cost.' When
reliable evidence is suppressed at trials and hearings, the
exclusionary rule obstructs the fact-finding role of the tribu-
nal." In United States v. Payner," the Supreme Court stated,
81. As early as 1928, for example, the Court, in Olnstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928), stated:
A standard which would forbid the reception of evidence, if obtained by
other than nice ethical conduct by government officials, would make soci-
ety suffer and give criminals greater immunity than has been known
heretofore. In the absence of controlling legislation by Congress, those
who realize the difficulties in bringing offenders to justice may well deem
it wise that the exclusion of evidence should be confined to cases where
rights under the Constitution would be violated by admitting it.
Id. at 468.
82. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (citing Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).
83. See Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the Status
Quo Ante, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 261 (1998) (proposing that, in recent years,
the Court has moved to a restoration-based justification for the exclusionary rule).
84. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978) ("Each time the
exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of
Fourth Amendment rights.").
85. See David B. Altman, Fifth Amendment--Coercion and Clarity: The Supreme
Court Approves, 80 J. CRIun. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1086, 1109 (1990) (comparing the
ramifications of Mapp u. Ohio with those of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
1999] 645
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
"our cases have consistently recognized that unbending applica-
tion of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmen-
tal rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding func-
tions of the judge and jury."' As a result of evidentiary exclu-
sion, guilty defendants may enter into favorable plea bargains
or escape punishment altogether.' Furthermore, the release of
guilty defendants increases the likelihood that the unpunished
offenders will commit substantially similar crimes in the fu-
ture.
89
Allowing ostensibly guilty defendants to go free also has a
negative impact upon the societal perceptions of the justice sys-
tem.9 °  The release of guilty defendants based upon
exclusionary rule technicalities contributes to public frustration
with the courts.91 Because the judicial system's authority rests
heavily upon societal perceptions of its integrity, any degree of
public frustration adversely affects the power of the courts to
administer justice.9 2
Economic considerations also factor in against the universal
application of the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule eco-
nomically "overdeters" illegal searches." Judge Posner theo-
rizes that evidentiary exclusion is remarkably inefficient. 4 For
example, an illegal search may cost the victim one hundred
(1966)).
86. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
87. Id. at 734 (citations omitted).
88. See Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2020
(1998); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976) ("The disparity ... be-
tween the error committed by the police officer and the windfall afforded a guilty
defendant . . . is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the con-
cept of justice.").
89. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987).
90. See William Patrick Nelson, Comment, Should the Ranch Go Free Because the
Constable Blundered? Gaining Compliance with Search and Seizure Standards in the
Age of Asset Forfeiture, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1356-57 (1992); see also Warren E.
Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchmen?, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1964).
91. See Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science
Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COmP. L. 871, 872 (1997) (citing
national surveys which indicated that, between the years 1970 and 1990, over 80% of
Americans felt that the courts were too lenient on crime).
92. See William J. Genego, Forfeiture, Legitimation and a Due Process Right to
Counsel, 59 BROOK L. REV. 337, 371 n.96 (1993).
93. Morris, supra note 6, at 659.
94. See id. at 660 (citing R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977)).
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dollars in clean up costs and related expenses.95 When the evi-
dence obtained from the search is later excluded at trial, how-
ever, the resulting economic loss to society due to the inability
to convict the accused is far greater than the harm done by the
search." Thus, Posner advocates levying fines against officers
for conducting illegal searches, payable directly to the victims of
the search. ' By limiting the fine to the amount of damages
incurred by the victim, the goal of economic efficiency may be
best served.98
The social costs of exclusion are particularly acute in parole
revocation settings. Statistically, parolees are likelier to commit
antisocial and criminal acts than are members of the general
community.99 Given the social and economic costs of crime,
states have a duty to protect their citizens from paroled offend-
ers.' 0 Thus, states have a legitimate interest in a parole sys-
tem which closely regulates and supervises parolees. To accom-
plish this end, the Supreme Court has sanctioned state practic-
es that circumscribe parolees' rights to be free from unreason-
able searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.
Historically, courts have limited the Fourth Amendment
rights of parolees under the "contract consent" and "constructive
custody" theories.' According to the "contract consent" theo-
ry, parolees voluntarily relinquish certain Fourth Amendment
guarantees in exchange for a conditional release from incarcera-
tion. "' Thus, parolees bargain away their constitutional
95. See id.
96. See id at 660.
97. See id. at 661. See generally Alan Dalsass, Note, Options: An Alternative Per-
spective on Fourth Amendment Remedies, 50 RUTGERS L. REv. 2297 (1998) (describing
the merits of utilizing liquidated damages in Fourth Amendment cases).
98. See Morris, supra note 6, at 666.
99. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987) ("It is the very assumption
of the institution of probation that the probationer is in need of rehabilitation and is
more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law.. .. '). But see Silas J.
Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional
Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 101 (1988) (warning that treating select groups differently
under the Fourth Amendment discriminates against politically powerless minorities,
such as parolees).
100. But see Barry Jeffrey Stern, Warrants Without Probable Cause, 59 BRoOK. L.
REV. 1385, 1387-88 (1994).
101. See Note, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38
N.Y.U. L. REV. 702, 708-20 (1963).
102. See People v. Mason, 488 P.2d 630, 634 (1971); Steven Monteforte, Note, Ad-
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entitlements to achieve physical emancipation. In contrast, the
"constructive custody" theory holds that parolees are still under
the legal custody of the prison system and, therefore, are enti-
tled only to those constitutional rights imparted to incarcerated
prisoners. °3  The parolee is considered a "quasi-prisoner,"
whose person, home, and belongings may be searched at the
discretion of the supervising officer."°
The United States Supreme Court rejected both the "contract
consent" and "constructive custody" theories in Morrissey v.
Brewer. °5 Specifically, the Court ruled that parolees have pro-
cedural due process rights that cannot be contracted away, nor
obviated by a custodial categorization of parolees."6 Neverthe-
less, the two theories meaningfully influence the Fourth
Amendment standards applicable to parolees. Although the
Court concluded that parolees are entitled to certain constitu-
tional guarantees, it also tacitly incorporated elements of the
two theories to assure that the societal interest in efficient
regulation of the parole system is best served.' Towards this
objective, the Court has countenanced certain abridgements of
parolees' constitutional rights.
Adopting an underlying tenet of the "constructive custody"
theory, the Morrissey Court concluded that parole is a "varia-
tion on imprisonment of convicted criminals."' Thus, parolees
are often regarded as within the custody of the penal system,
even though they are not actually incarcerated.' 9 Although a
missibility of Evidence in Probation/Parole Revocation Proceedings and in Criminal
Prosecutions: Applying a Single Standard, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 936, 942-44 (1982);
Note, supra note 101, at 708-11.
103. See People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. Rptr. 100, 104 (1964); Monteforte, supra
note 102, at 942-44; Note, supra note 101, at 711-20.
104. See Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923) (holding that although pa-
role "is an amelioration of punishment, it is in legal effect imprisonment").
105. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
106. See id. at 482 (We see, therefore, that the liberty of a parolee, although
indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termi-
nation inflicts a 'grievous loss' on the parolee and often on others."). The Court fur-
ther held that a parolee was entitled to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment
and was owed due process. See id.
107. See id. at 477-82.
108. Id. at 477. Elaborating on the proliferation of state parole systems, the Court
explained that the "purpose [of parole] is to help individuals reintegrate into society
as constructive individuals as soon as they are able, without being confined for the
full term of the sentence imposed." Id.
109. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240-41 (1963) (holding that a parolee
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parolee enjoys many of the same liberties as the ordinary per-
son, he is not owed the full panoply of legal rights guaranteed
to other citizens."' In conformance with the "contract consent"
theory, the Morrissey Court determined that parolees are enti-
tled to only "conditional liberty properly dependent on the ob-
servance of special parole restrictions.""' As a condition of
their release, parolees have voluntarily relinquished rights owed
to other nonincarcerated citizens. Because the Morrissey Court
found that "given [a] previous conviction... , the State has an
overwhelming interest in being able to return [an] ... individ-
ual to imprisonment... if in fact he has failed to abide by the
conditions of his parole," it was willing to narrow the constitu-
tional duties owed to parolees."2
The Scott Court harmonized the legitimate state regulatory
interests expressed in Morrissey with the social costs of exclud-
ing probative evidence at parole revocation hearings. The major-
ity recognized the legitimate state interest in efficient adminis-
tration of parole boards." 3 Concluding that the state interest
in the close supervision of parolees is based upon the high
likelihood of recidivism and upon the theory that parole is an
extension of imprisonment, the Scott Court expressed its reti-
cence to impede state parole systems."4 Even Justice Souter,
in his dissent, conceded that the state has an "'overwhelming
interest' in assuring its parolees comply with the conditions of
their parole .. .
The social costs associated with evidentiary exclusion further
exacerbated the Scott Court's reluctance to interfere with parole
board administration. The Court acknowledged that the
exclusionary rule "undeniably detracts from the truthfinding
may pursue habeas corpus proceedings because he was in the custody of the State).
110. See Daniel E. Post, Comment, The Constitutionality of Parole Departments
Disclosing the HIV Status of Parolees, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1993, 2009 (1992); see also
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 478 (asserting that parolees enjoy only conditional liberties).
111. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480.
112. Id. at 483.
113. See Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2020-21
(1998).
114. See id. at 2020 (-he costs of excluding reliable, probative evidence are partic-
ularly high in the context of parole revocation proceedings.").
115. Id. at 2027 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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process ..... "Although the Court has "held these costs to
be worth bearing in certain circumstances, [its] cases have
repeatedly emphasized that the rule's 'costly toll' upon truth-
seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle
for those urging application of the rule.""' Given the strong
state interest in efficient regulation of parole systems and the
social costs peculiar to the parole setting, the Court determined
that parole revocation hearings are improper venues for the
application of the exclusionary rule."8
The legitimate state interest in parole supervision, when
coupled with the social costs associated with evidentiary exclu-
sion, weighs heavily on one side of the Calandra balancing test.
To require the exclusion of evidence at parole revocation hear-
ings, according to Calandra, the deterrent effect of exclusion
must outweigh the significant interest in admitting probative
and reliable evidence."' Even before examining the deterrent
impact of the exclusionary rule, the Scott Court constructed an
insurmountable barrier to its subsequent application.
B. The Nature of Parole Revocation Hearings
Despite the overwhelming social costs associated with apply-
ing the exclusionary rule to parole revocation hearings, the
Scott Court nonetheless passed judgment upon the deterrent
effects of evidentiary exclusion. Historically, the Supreme Court
has found that the deterrent impact of the exclusionary rule
hinges upon the type of proceeding in which it is invoked. 20
The Court has held that the exclusionary rule should only be
applied to adversarial proceedings. 2' In order for the
116. Id. at 2020.
117. Id. (citing United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980)).
118. See id. at 2022 ("A federal requirement that parole boards apply the
exclusionary rule . . . would severely disrupt the traditionally informal, administrative
process of parole revocation.").
119. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974); see also United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984).
120. See Matthew F. Bogdanos, Search and Seizure: A Reasoned Approach, 6 PACE
L. REV. 543, 589 (1986). But see Calandra, 414 U.S. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(reasoning that rationales other than deterrence are of equal importance to any con-
sideration of the exclusionary rule).
121. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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exclusionary rule to have any deterrent effect, one side must be
made to suffer for its utilization of illegal fact-finding methods.
Where the proceedings are purely administrative, an order of
suppression will have no deterrent effect upon the offending
party.2 The rationale for this conclusion is that, in the ab-
sence of competition, the offending party will have little stake
in the ultimate outcome of the proceedings."2 Thus, the exclu-
sion of.evidence will not deter future illegal conduct, because
the offending party does not suffer as a result of evidentiary
suppression.
Prior to its consideration of parole revocation hearings, the
Supreme Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule to a
wide variety of proceedings that it characterized as purely ad-
ministrative."2 Before Scott, the most recent decision involv-
ing a proposed extension of the exclusionary rule was Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza."2 In this
case, the Court considered extending the exclusionary rule to
encompass the suppression of illegally obtained evidence at
deportation hearings. Ruling that the exclusionary rule should
not apply, the Court found that "a deportation proceeding is a
purely civil action to determine the eligibility to remain in this
country, not to punish an unlawful entry, though entering or
remaining unlawfully in this country is itself a crime."'26 Al-
though a deportation proceeding directly affects an individual's
right to reside freely within the United States, the Supreme
Court nonetheless considered it an administrative action."7
Thus, if no criminal sanctions are to be levied, the Court will
not suppress illegally obtained evidence.'
122. See Bernard Schwartz, A Decade of Administrative Law: 1987-1996, 32 TULSA
L.J. 493, 539 (1997) (citing Boyd v. Constantine, 613 N.E.2d 511, 512 (N.Y. 1993)).
123. See Benjamin A. Swift, Comment, The Future of the Exclusionary Rule: An Al-
ternative Analysis for the Adjudication of Individual Rights, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
507, 528-29 (1996) (explaining the Court's requirement that both parties have a sig-
nificant interest in the ultimate outcome of the litigation for the exclusionary rule to
apply).
124. See cases cited supra note 11.
125. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
126. Id. at 1038 (citations omitted).
127. See Mitchell Barnes Davis & Kathleen B. Simon, Comment, The Exclusionary
Rule in INS Deportation Hearings, 23 LAND & WATER L. REv. 537, 566 (1988) (as-
serting that, despite the purely administrative nature of deportation proceedings, the
exclusionary rule should be invoked to ensure judicial integrity).
128. See Donald L. Doernberg, 'The Right of the People": Reconciling Collective and
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In his dissent, Justice White criticized the majority's charac-
terization of deportation hearings. White analogized the mission
of border control agents to that of police officers, finding that
the role of each was to produce evidence relating to violations
of the law.'29 The only discernable difference between the
functions of each type of law enforcement officer is that the evi-
dence obtained from suspects is introduced at different types of
proceedings. 3 ° Police officers submit their findings to criminal
courts, while border control agents introduce evidence at depor-
tation hearings. White concluded, therefore, that "deportation
proceedings are to [border control] agents what criminal trials
are to police officers ....""' Because the goal of the border
control agent is to ferret out illegal aliens, any suppression of
evidence at deportation hearings will have a detrimental effect
upon the performance of his duties. 32 Thus, the adversarial
nature of deportation hearings is closely akin to criminal trials
because the law enforcement officers have a stake in ensuring
the admission of probative evidence. Accordingly, White assert-
ed that border control agents will be deterred from conducting
illegal searches by the application of the exclusionary rule at
civil deportation hearings.'
The Scott decision closely resembles that of Lopez-Mendoza.
In each case, the Court endeavored to categorize the proceed-
Individual Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 289-90
(1983).
129. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1053 (White, J., dissenting).
130. See id. at 1053-54 (White, J., dissenting). -'The primary objective' of the INS
agent is to use evidence in the civil deportation proceeding," whereas the police pro-
duce evidence at criminal trials. Id. at 1053 (White, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
132. See Silas Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the
Scaffold: But Was it a Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 127-28 (1984).
133. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1060 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White
advocated the application of the exclusionary rule to deportation proceedings for the
same reasons for which the Court applied the rule to criminal trials:
I believe that the costs and benefits of applying the exclusionary rule in
civil deportation proceedings do not differ in any significant way from the
costs and benefits of applying the rule in ordinary criminal proceedings.
Unless the exclusionary rule is to be wholly done away with and the
Court's belief that it has deterrent effects abandoned, it should be ap-
plied in deportation proceedings when evidence has been obtained by
deliberate violations of the Fourth Amendment or by conduct a reason-
ably competent officer would know is contrary to the Constitution.
Id. (White, J., dissenting).
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ings at which government officials attempted to introduce ille-
gally obtained evidence. The Scott Court concluded that parole
revocation hearings are entirely administrative; therefore, the
exclusionary rule should not apply." Like the Lopez-Mendoza
Court, the majority in Scott concluded that, in the absence of
an adversarial criminal proceeding, the exclusionary rule will
have no deterrent effect upon officer misconduct. 35
To explain its categorization of parole revocation hearings as
being "administrative proceedings," the Court described the
flexible and informal qualities of Pennsylvania's parole sys-
tem." 6 Specifically, the Court found that: (1) neither judges
nor lawyers are required at parole revocation hearings; (2) tra-
ditional rules of evidence are relaxed or do not apply at all; and
(3) there is no mechanism for collateral litigation concerning
evidentiary suppression. 3 ' Having considered these factors,
the Scott Court determined that "the exclusionary rule . . is
incompatible with the traditionally flexible, administrative pro-
cedures of parole revocation."" The majority reasoned that
adoption of the rule would fundamentally change the parole
revocation process from a "predictive and discretionary" hearing
to an aggressively adversarial proceeding.39  "Such a
transformation ultimately might disadvantage parolees because
in an adversarial proceeding, 'the hearing body may be less tol-
erant of marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure to
reincarcerate than to continue nonpunitive rehabilitation." 4
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion assailed the reasoning
underlying the majority's classification of parole revocation
hearings. Although Souter conceded that revocation hearings
134. See Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2020-21
(1998).
135. See id. at 2022 ("[W]hen the officer performing the search is a parole officer,
the deterrence benefits of the exclusionary rule remain limited.").
136. See id. at 2021.
137. See id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 489 (1972)).
138. Id. at 2020.
139. See id. at 2021 (citations omitted). By altering the parole revocation process,
the Court warned that the application of the exclusionary rule would impose substan-
tial amounts of collateral litigation upon already overburdened state courts. See id.
This litigation would hinder states' interests in parole system efficiency. "Such litiga-
tion is inconsistent with the nonadversarial, administrative processes established by
the States." Id.
140. Id. (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973)).
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were partially discretionary and predictive, he also asserted
that the hearings contained an adversarial element sanctioning
the use of the exclusionary rule.' To counter the majority's
claim that parole revocation is an informal process, Justice
Souter cited Gagnon v. Scarpelli in which the Supreme
Court required that parolees be provided with counsel under
circumstances similar to Scott.' Souter concluded that lay
board members were "just as capable of passing upon Fourth
Amendment issues as the police, who are necessarily charged
with the responsibility for the legality of warrantless arrests,
investigatory stops, and searches."' Thus, Souter reasoned
that if courts trusted police officers to determine the appropri-
ateness of a search or seizure, then so too should courts vest
parole boards with the power to determine if illegally obtained
evidence should be excluded. 45
Corroborating the dissent's reasoning is the fact that parole
revocation hearings are usually the forum of choice for officers
who have uncovered crimes committed by parolees.'46 Rather
than pursuing new charges in a criminal court, parole officers
will often bring the offender before a parole revocation
board. 47 The administrative ease of recommitment, coupled
with the fact that the parolees' "time on the street" (the
amount of time between formal parole and parole revocation)
will not be deducted from their sentence, encourages law en-
forcement officers to use the parole revocation process. " 8 For
141. See id. at 2023, 2026 (Souter, J., dissenting). "The deterrent function of the
exclusionary rule is . . . implicated as much by a revocation proceeding as by a con-
ventional trial, and the exclusionary rule should be applied accordingly." Id. at 2023
(Souter, J., dissenting).
142. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
143. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2027 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Gagnon, 411 U.S.
at 787) ("Any revocation hearing is adversary to a degree: counsel must now be pro-
vided whenever the complexity of the fact issues so warrant . . .).
144. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489
(1972) (authorizing the administration of parole revocation proceedings by lay per-
sons).
145. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2027 (Souter, J., dissenting).
146. See Sunny A.M. Koshy, Note, The Right of [All] the People to be Secure: Ex-
tending Fundamental Fourth Amendment Rights to Probationers and Parolees, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 49, 50 & n.7 (1988).
147. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2027 (Souter, J., dissenting).
148. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480 ("If a parolee is returned to prison, he usually
receives no credit for the time 'served' on parole.").
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example, a parolee accused of drug-related offenses may receive
a two-year prison sentence if convicted in criminal court. In
many cases, the police will forego formally trying the accused
and simply take him before a parole board. In a parole revoca-
tion hearing, the drug offender will likely be sentenced to serve
the remainder of his time, plus any "time on the street." The
recommitment term will often equal or exceed the sentence
under a criminal conviction." Because states often use parole
revocation hearings in lieu of criminal trials, Souter concluded
that there is an adversarial nature to the proceedings which
warrants the application of the exclusionary rule.5
Some federal circuits have equated the process of parole
revocation to the initiation of new criminal charges. Asserting
that parole revocation hearings are as adversarial as criminal
trials, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the exclusionary rule
should be applied in "any adjudicative proceeding in which the
government offers unconstitutionally seized evidence in direct
support of a charge that may subject the victim of a search to
imprisonment."'' Similarly, the Second Circuit ruled that "the
exclusionary rule must be applied in probation revocation pro-
ceedings to bar the use of evidence illegally seized by probation
officers." 5 ' Even prior to the Scott decision, however, these
jurisdictions were in the minority.'53 To the extent that they
label parole revocation hearings as adversarial proceedings and
mandate the use of the exclusionary rule, these decisions have
been overruled by Scott."
149. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2027 (Souter, J., dissenting).
150. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter further explained:
Suppression in the revocation proceeding cannot be looked upon . .. as
furnishing merely incremental or marginal deterrence over and above the
effect of exclusion in criminal prosecution. Instead, it will commonly pro-
vide the only deterrence to unconstitutional conduct when the incarcera-
tion of the parolees is sought, and the reasons that support the suppres-
sion remedy in prosecution therefore support it in parole revocation.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
151. United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1211 (4th Cir. 1978).
152. United States v. Rea, 678 F.2d 382, 389 (2d Cir. 1982).
153. See COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 69, § 8.06, at 386-87. The majority of fed-
eral circuits have held that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable at parole revocation
hearings. See, e.g., United States v. Frederickson, 581 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1978); Unit-
ed States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d
160 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Brown, 488 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971).
154. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2022 ("We therefore hold that parole boards are not
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Some critics warn that a nonadversarial categorization of
parole revocation hearings produces a danger that societal in-
terests may be subjugated to police efficiency concerns.'55
Rather than levying additional criminal charges against parole
violators, officers are content to merely recommit the parolee
for the remainder of his original term.'56 This approach pro-
vides a disincentive to conduct searches in a reasonable manner
and creates a two-tiered system of evidentiary admissibility
whereby evidence may be admitted at parole revocation but
excluded at a new criminal trial.'57 An officer's unreasonable
search deprives society of the ability to prosecute a parole of-
fender on new criminal charges because the evidence, obtained
illegally by the officer (who has little interest in pursuing new
charges), will be excluded at any subsequent criminal trial.'58
The Scott Court, nonetheless, concluded that parole revoca-
tion hearings were purely administrative.159 The Cou4 rea-
soned that any disincentive to conducting reasonable searches
could be curtailed through the use of departmental disciplinary
sanctions or the levying of fines. 60 According to the Court,
such means would provide the necessary incentive to officers
conducting searches of parolees' persons, homes, and belongings
required by federal law to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.").
155. See Monteforte, supra note 102, at 960 ("Courts refusing to extend the
exclusionary rule to probation revocation proceedings under these circumstances,
therefore, create the danger that a police officer with such knowledge will conduct a
substandard search and that incriminating evidence will not be put to its maximum
use for the protection of society.").
156. See id.
157. See United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1164 (2d Cir.
1970). To justify its double standard for evidentiary admissibility, the court stated:
There is no need for double application of the exclusionary rule, using it
first as it was used here in preventing criminal prosecution of the parol-
ee and a second time at a parole revocation hearing. The deterrent pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule is adequately served by the exclusion of the
unlawfully seized evidence in the criminal prosecution.
Id.
158. See Monteforte, supra note 102, at 957 ("This loss seriously impairs the abili-
ty of society to commit a criminal offender to a term of imprisonment in addition to
whatever term the revocation might yield.").
159. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2020 ("The exclusionary rule, moreover, is incompati-
ble with the traditionally flexible, administrative procedures of parole revocation.").
160. See id. at 2022.
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and would preserve the societal interest in pursuing new crimi-
nal charges against wayward parolees.'61
By categorizing revocation hearings as nonadversarial, the
Scott Court sought to safeguard the flexible hearing systems in
place in most states.'62 The Court downplayed or ignored the
competitive elements inherent within the parole revocation
system and asserted that it was "simply unwilling to intrude
into the States' correctional schemes."" The Scott Court de-
termined that a nonadversarial categorization of parole revoca-
tion hearings was essential to ensure the continued efficacy of
state parole systems.' Such a categorization has a corre-
sponding impact upon the role of parole officers within states'
correctional programs.
C. The Role of Parole Officers
The nature of parole revocation hearings has a direct effect
upon the duties and functions of parole officers." If the pro-
ceedings are categorized as purely administrative, parole offi-
cers have little stake in the ultimate outcome of parole revoca-
tion hearings."6 Therefore, the suppression of illegally ob-
tained evidence will have no deterrent impact upon their future
conduct."' If, however, there is an adversarial component of
the parole hearings, then the officers do have an interest in
supplying the tribunal with any and all probative evidence
which may result in parole revocation." By suppressing un-
constitutionally obtained evidence, the exclusionary rule would
deter unreasonable searches and seizures.'69
161. See id.
162. See id. at 2020.
163. Id. at 2021.
164. The Scott Court cited Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972), for the
proposition that "States have an 'overwhelming interest' in maintaining informal,
administrative parole revocation procedures." Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2021.
165. See Note, supra note 80, at 186.
166. See David Blair-Loy, Judicial Neglect for the Statutory Basis for the Rosario
Rule: The Genesis of the Possession or Control Requirement, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 469, 475
(1997).
167. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2022.
168. See id. at 2025 (Souter, J., dissenting).
169. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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In many respects, parole officers are similar to social workers
and counselors. 7 ' In Morrissey v. Brewer,7' the Supreme
Court concluded that "realistically the failure of the parolee is
in a sense a failure for his supervising officer."'72 Under this
view, the primary function of parole officers is to assist their
assigned parolees in the transition from incarceration to free-
dom. "'73 Thus, under the reasoning of the Morrissey Court, the
investigatory role of the parole officer is subrogated by a more
important state interest in counseling and assisting parol-
ees.'74 Upon the failure of the parole officer to keep an as-
signed parolee "on the straight and narrow," however, the in-
vestigatory duties of the officer will become paramount."5
Recognizing the primacy of parole officers' counseling func-
tions, many states have granted parole authority to their re-
spective departments of social services.'76 In states where pa-
role supervision still rests with the department of corrections,
great pains are taken to eliminate the prosecutorial elements of
parole enforcement. 7 ' The American Bar Association has even
recommended that, in order to avoid any conflicts between
prosecutorial and counseling functions, parole and probation
officers should not be under the direction of state prosecu-
tors. 17 8 Thus, in most states, efforts have been made to for-
mally divorce parole administration from the law enforce-
ment/prosecutorial system. States aspire to rehabilitate parolees
through counseling, rather than engaging in adversarial law en-
forcement practices throughout the duration of parole.'79
170. See Craig Hemmens & Rolando V. Del Carmen, The Exclusionary Rule in
Probation and Parole Revocation Proceedings: Does it Apply?, 61 FED. PROBATION,
Sept. 1997, 32, 33-34 (concluding that most states consider parole officers "treatment
agents" and "rehabilitation counselors").
171. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
172. Id. at 485-86.
173. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2022.
174. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 486.
175. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2025 (Souter, J., dissenting).
176. See COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 69, § 8.01, at 373.
177. See id.
178. See id. (citing American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal
Justice, Standards Relating to Probation § 6.1(b) (Approved Draft 1970)).
179. See, e.g., N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 257(4) (McKinney 1999) which provides:
It shall be the duty of every probation officer to furnish to each of his
probationers a statement of the conditions of probation, and to instruct
him with regard thereto; to keep informed concerning his conduct, habits,
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In Scott, the majority emphasized the counseling functions of
parole officers. Rather than engaging "in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime,' ""O the Court found that pa-
role officers' "primary concern is whether their parolees should
remain free on parole."' 8' The Court concluded that the rela-
tionship between the officer and the parolee is merely supervi-
sory and not adversarial.'82 Because the relationship lacks an
adversarial element, the majority held that parole officers bear
no natural hostility to their assigned parolees and should be
considered entirely neutral.'" The Court conceded that parole
officers may sometimes violate the Fourth Amendment by con-
ducting unreasonable searches, but asserted that, considering
their neutrality, exclusion would have no deterrent effect."M
Rather than excluding probative evidence, the Court recom-
mended departmental discipline and damages actions.'"
In practice, however, an exclusive focus upon the counseling
functions of parole officers ignores the basic realities underlying
the parole system. A parole officer has three fundamental re-
sponsibilities: "(1) to assist the offender in the rehabilitation
process; (2) to protect the public from persons whose release
proves threatening to the community; and (3) to provide infor-
mation and recommendations to the court or parole board so
that it may make appropriate decisions regarding continued
freedom for the individual released."'86 The latter two func-
associates, employment, recreation and whereabouts; to contact him at
least once a month pursuant to rules promulgated by the state director
of probation and correctional alternatives; to aid and encourage him by
friendly advice and admonition; and by such other measures as may
seem most suitable to-bring about improvement in his conduct, condition
and general attitude toward society. •
Id.
180. Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2022 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914
(1984)).
181. Id.
182. See id. ("Their relationship is more supervisory than adversarial.").
183. See id. "It is thus 'unfair to assume that the parole officer bears hostility
against the parolee that destroys his neutrality . . . ." Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brew-
er, 408 U.S. 471, 485-86).
184. See id.
185. See id. But see Yale Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility" and the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1, 35 n.148 (1987) (detailing the
inadequacies of alternative deterrent remedies such as civil suits, criminal
prosecution, review boards, and internal discipline).
186. COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 69, § 8.01, at 372.
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tions require parole officers to engage in investigative and su-
pervisory capacities which are often at odds with the traditional
administrative view of the parole system.
To reconcile the competing responsibilities of parole officers,
most states advocate a synthetic model of parole
administration.187 Under this approach, officers balance the
law enforcement interests of the community with the rehabilita-
tive requirements of the individual parolee." Each parolee's
needs are assessed on a case-by-case basis and then, ideally,
the parole agency develops a parole plan based both upon those
needs and the individual strengths of the supervising offi-
cer. 89 In practice, however, most agencies eschew the synthet-
ic model in favor of approaches that advocate and emphasize
stauncher law enforcement methods.9 ° The law enforcement
model of parole administration contains adversarial elements
similar to traditional police law enforcement.'
Justice Souter's dissent recognized the adversarial elements
of the parole system and was highly critical of the majority's
characterization of the relationship between officers and parol-
ees. Conceding the existence of a counseling element to the
relationship, Souter nonetheless reasoned, "[plarole officers wear
several hats; while they are indeed the parolees' counselors and
social workers, they also 'often serve as both prosecutors and
law enforcement officials in their relationship with probationers
and parolees.""92 The dissent proposed a more expansive view
of parole officers than had been recognized by the majority. Be-
cause of the various functions of the parole officers, their rela-
tionships to assigned parolees are subject to constant
change.
93
187. See id. § 8.01, at 374; see also HOWARD ABADINSKY, PROBATION AND PAROLE:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 254-55 (2d ed. 1982).
188. See COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 69, § 8.01, at 374.
189. See id.
190. See id. ("Although most [parole] agencies espouse the synthetic model, they
often in practice lean more toward a control model.").
191. See id.
192. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2025
(Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 69, § 11.04, at 533).
193. See Peter J. Gardner, Comment, Arrest and Search Powers of Special Police in
Pennsylvania: Do Your Constitutional Rights Change Depending on the Officer's Uni-
form?, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 497, 532-34 (1986).
660 [Vol. 33:631
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
When parole officers become aware that their assigned parol-
ees have likely committed violations, there is a fundamental
change in the nature of the relationship."M Whereas the ma-
jority exclusively considered the supervisory aspects of the pa-
role relationship, the dissent recognized the resulting changes
which occur upon parole violations. "[An exclusive focus on the
benevolent attitudes of those who administer the proba-
tion/parole system when it is working successfully obscures the
modification in attitude which is likely to take place once the
officer has decided to recommend revocation."'95 Indeed, once
the relationship has changed from supervisory to adversarial,
parole officers are likely to exhibit as much "competitive zeal"
as are police officers. 6 Given the often competitive interest of
parole officers in collaring wayward parolees, the dissent rea-
soned that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence will have
a similar effect upon parole officers as upon the police.'97 In
other words, parole officers have a stake in the ultimate out-
come of parole revocation hearings; therefore, the exclusion of
unconstitutionally obtained evidence will likely deter future
misconduct.' 8 Thus, according to the dissent, the exclusion of
evidence at parole revocation proceedings would have the deter-
rent effect required by the Calandra balancing test.
IV. TOWARD ABROGATING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Since Calandra, the United States Supreme Court has nar-
rowly circumscribed the application of the exclusionary rule.'99
The Scott Court further restricted the suppression of illegally
obtained evidence. The rationales underlying the Court's curtail-
ment of the exclusionary rule may foreshadow an establishment
of a per se rule that bans the application of the rule outside of
194. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2025-26 (Souter, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 2026 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
785 (1973)).
196. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
197. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting) ("In sum, if the police need the deterrence of
an exclusionary rule to offset the temptations to forget the Fourth Amendment, .parole
officers need it quite as much.").
198. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
199. See Carolyn A. Yagla, Comment, The Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule: The Latest Example of 'New Federalism' in the States, 71 MARQ. L.
REv. 166, 178 (1987).
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the criminal trial context. Further, the Court's reasoning may
presage a sanctioning of alternative remedies even in the crimi-
nal trial context.
The Scott Court recognized that the state interest in regulat-
ing parolees creates an insuperable obstacle for those advocat-
ing the exercise of the exclusionary rule at parole revocation
hearings.2 0 The social harm created by excluding probative
evidence against parolees outweighs any deterrent impact upon
law enforcement personnel.0 1 Nevertheless, the Scott Court
went to great lengths to dispel any perceived deterrent effects
of evidentiary exclusion in the parole revocation setting.0 2 Al-
though it was unnecessary to disparage the deterrent effects of
exclusion to justify its refusal to extend the exclusionary rule
under the Calandra "balancing of interests" test, the Scott
Court still clearly explained its conclusion that law enforcement
officers will not be deterred by excluding evidence from parole
revocation hearings. The very fact that this analysis was unnec-
essary in Scott indicates that the Court will be very reluctant
to acknowledge any deterrent effect to the exclusion of evidence
from similar proceedings. Thus, the Scott Court's dicta concern-
ing deterrence is likely to be used in the future to deny the
application of the exclusionary rule to other quasi-criminal pro-
ceedings, especially where the social interests involved are less
pronounced than in Scott.
The Scott Court characterized the exclusionary rule as a
"grudgingly taken medicant" °3 that would provide "marginal
deterrence of unreasonable searches and seizures." In the parole
revocation setting, the Court emphasized that other deterrents,
such as departmental discipline and the threat of damages
actions, are more effective and eliminate the need for evidentia-
ry exclusion.2 Under this reasoning, however, the exclu-
sionary rule should never be invoked in legal proceedings." 5 If
200. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2020 ("The rule's 'costly toll' upon truth-seeking and
law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging application of the
rule.").
201. See id. at 2021 ("he deterrence benefits of the exclusionary rule would not
outweigh [the] costs").
202. See id. at 2021-22.
203. Id. at 2022 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 n.29 (1976)).
204. See id.
205. See Gary S. Goodpaster, An Essay on Ending the Exclusionary Rule, 33
662 [Vol. 33:631
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
the Court has determined that other deterrents are equally
effective at preventing unreasonable searches, then why sanc-
tion the use of the exclusionary rule with all of its attendant
social harms? The Court should not endorse the use of a
"grudgingly taken medicant" when other deterrent measures are
available.
Given the entrenchment of the exclusionary rule in the
American criminal justice system, it seems very unlikely that
the Supreme Court will discontinue using it in criminal trials.
Perhaps the Court recognizes that the exclusionary rule often
sets in motion the alternative remedies espoused in Scott. When
a state or federal prosecutor is unable to use evidence at trial,
those commissioned to collect the evidence will ultimately be
held accountable, whether they be local police officers, state
investigators, or federal agents.2" The exclusion of evidence
sets in motion a chain of accountability that extends to all
those who have worked on the case and serves as the most
effective deterrent to future misconduct.
Reluctant to abrogate the use of exclusionary rule in criminal
trials yet unwilling to extend it to administrative proceedings,
the Supreme Court has struggled to rationalize and justify this
dichotomy. In Scott, the Court's use of the Calandra "balancing
of interests" test proves unconvincing, given the many similari-
ties between parole revocation hearings and criminal trials.
Although the Court's reasoning is suspect, its intent is quite
clear: to preserve the exclusionary rule in criminal trials, while
moving closer to a per se ban on its use in all other proceed-
ings. In all likelihood, future Supreme Court decisions will also
attempt to use the Calandra test to distinguish the deterrent
effects of exclusion in criminal trials to those in quasi-criminal
proceedings. The Court appears quite willing to employ strained
or artificial distinctions in order to preserve its ban on the use
of the exclusionary rule outside the criminal trial context.
HASTINGS L.J. 1065, 1071-72 (1982) (proposing alternatives to the exclusionary rule).
206. See James P. Fleissner, Glide Path to an "Inclusionary Rule": How Expansion
of the Good Faith Exception Threatens to Fundamentally Change the Exclusionary
Rule, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1023, 1043 (1997) (explaining that the exclusionary rule
catalyzes a stronger relationship between police and prosecutor and encourages the
proper training of law enforcement personnel).
207. See id.
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V. CONCLUSION
In Scott, the Supreme Court moved ever closer to establish-
ing a per se ban on the application of the exclusionary rule
outside of the criminal trial context. Although the Court at-
tempted to justify its position using the Calandra balancing
test, it underestimated the deterrent effect of exclusion upon
parole officers." 8 The dissent convincingly seized upon the in-
adequacies of the Court's analysis and made a strong case for
the deterrent impact of the rule. Ultimately, however, despite
the persuasive findings of the dissent, the state interest in
regulating paroled felons outweighs the deterrent effect upon
the parole officers charged with policing the released offenders.
The Scott Court's gross understatement of the deterrent im-
pact of the exclusionary rule displays its absolute reluctance to
extend the rule, which has characterized the Supreme Court
ever since Calandra."9 Most notable in the Court's holding is
the length to which it attempted to minimize the importance of
the exclusionary rule in deterring misconduct by law enforce-
ment officers. Considering the "'overwhelming interest' in ensur-
ing that a parolee complies with [the conditions of his pa-
role],"210 the Court's understatement of the rule's deterrent
impact was unnecessary to tip the Calandra scales toward
refraining from applying the rule. Despite the deterrent impact,
the social and economic costs of applying the exclusionary rule
are too high in the parole revocation context.2" The Scott
Court's decision may be a harbinger for a per se rule banning
the exclusionary rule outside the criminal trial context. By
displaying the lengths to which it will go to minimize the rule's
deterrent effect, Scott foreshadows a progressively narrower
application of the exclusionary rule.
Richard F. Dzubin
208. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2025-26 (Souter, J., dissenting).
209. See supra notes 11, 68 and accompanying text.
210. Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2020 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483
(1972)).
211. See discussion supra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
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